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PREFACE
On February 6, 1978, in the midst of the worst blizzard to hit the Northeast
in 100 years, the 682-foot Greek tanker GLOBAL HOPE with more than 340,000
gallons of oil aboard, dragged her anchor and grounded in Salem Sound, Massachusetts,
about 15 miles from downtown Boston. An estimated 83,000 gallons of oil escaped
the stricken vessel to be deposited on two of the most historic and picturesque
coastlines of Massachusetts. Some 2.4 million dollars were expended from the
federal pollution fund in cleanup efforts.
As a result of the storm and the damage sustained by the vessel, unusual
strains were placed upon the federal on-scene coordinator (OSC). Inasmuch as
the famed ARGO MERCHANT stranding case had also occurred off Massachusetts
just 14 months before, there was an unusually high degree of local public concern
that the pollution response to this new incident be effective and prompt, no matter
what field problems had to be over-come because of the extreme weather conditions.
This paper relates the chronology of events and examines peculiar problems,
planning, and response activities of federal on-scene coordination during the
incident. In addition, state and federal agency involvement are described relative
to the flexibility, ingenuity, and orchestration required to deal with the myriad
contmgencies which arose during the response to the grounding and the subsequent
pollution under the most extreme weather conditions.
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INTRODUCTION

At 6 A.M., Wednesday, 15 December 1976, the Liberian vessel Argo Merchant,
a six-hundred forty foot, thirty thousand, deadweight ton tanker grounded near
Fishing Rip on Nantucket Shoals twenty-eight miles southeast of Nantucket Island.
Eventually the vessel broke up and expelled her cargo of 7.2 million gallons of
No.6 fuel oil into the turbulent North Atlantic. As in any saga, the impact of
the grounding has had wide reprecussions and the incident has served as a bench
mark for progress made in the quality and effectiveness of federal and state
response efforts to critical pollution incidents.
Captain Walter Folger, USCG, was chairman of the Regional Response
Team (RRT) at the time of the Argo Merchant grounding. Himself a Nantucketer,
as well as a salty ex-merchant seaman, the Captain had an abiding affection
for his beloved Nantucket and a reverent regard for the power of the sea. He
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was aware that Nantucket Shoals had seldom relinquished any ship whose folley
it was to traverse her shallows. Two days passed before his warnings of the
imminent disaster to befall the "Argo" registered with the media. When finally
the peril to the grounded tanker became known, frequent press conferences and
political inquiries generated, replete with all the jingling harness of TV cameras,
floodlights, jockying reporters, and demanding pols. It was in one such spectical
that the scene was set for the continuing agony of the "Argo". Captain Folger,
in responding to inquiries about Nantucket Shoals, mentioned the catastrophic
history of the area. Immediately, a reporter waving his note pad leaped to his

. reference to the"
"
. exclaimed,
.
. Captain!
.
feet and m
Argo's
grounding,
"Captam!
.

Did I understand you to say that this incident was a catastrophe?" The Captain
gazed at him over his glasses and responded, "Young man, anytime you try to
bring a fully loaded, six-hundred and fifty foot tanker overland, without wheels
on it, you've got a catastrophe!"
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act l (FWPCA) and its implementing
regulations, the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
f!!.!l2, it fell to the Federal government to respond to the pollution threat posed
by the Argo Merchant. Due to the Coastal location of the incident, the Coast
Guard served as lead agency in directing all response efforts. Two misconceptions
prevailed, however. First, many agencies, both state and federal, looked upon
the federal effort as being a Coast Guard responsibility. Little interest was
shown initially by any agency other than the EPA in supporting a combined state
or federal effort. In fact, despite the claims of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
the state showed no interest whatsoever in the grounding until two days later
when the press became concerned. The Commonwealth had been invited to send
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a representative to the Regional Response Team some months before.That
organization comprised the forum and technical/logistical support organization
under the National Contingency Plan. A low level employee from the Commonwealth's
Department of Environmental Affairs was appointed. Within two hours of the
Argo Merchant's grounding, he was advised and asked to join with the team.
Two days and five phone calls later he appeared, with no authority to speak
for the Commonwealth. He left two hours later.
The Argo Merchant has been identified as a laboratory phenomenon by
research and development types. Never before had such a threat tested the
new sciences developed to deal with oil spills in the U.S.
tb~ljedQral response
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By the same token

machinery was scrutinized and found sluggish at least.

Though the On-scene Coordinator (OCS), a Coast Guard Officer, and other Coast
Guard forces strove to resolve the struggle between vessel and sea and ultimately
between sea and oil, inland, the federal forces galvinized in support of units .
in the field found themselves beleaguered by the press, politicians and the populace.
As a first experience, lines of communication were untried and responsibilities
vague.
Over the subsequent months, however, efforts were made by the Chairman
of the RRT to streamline the operation of that organization as well as to identify
the means for supporting units on the beach. The grounding of the Global Hope
provided the testing ground. Though not carrying 7.5 million gallons of number
6 fuel oil, as in the case of the Argo Merchant, the Global Hope was potentially
more dangerous due to her proximity to land. The federal response to the incident
in Salem Sound was concerted and cooperative in spite of the severest conditions.
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The Global Hope would cost the government 2.4 million dollars and the
federal/response would extend from February to August 1978.

II CHRONOLOGY

Wednesday, 1 February 1978:The Greek registered tanker GLOBAL HOPE
was berthed at New England Power Company's facility at Salem, Massachusetts
and proceeded to off-load her cargo of number 6 fuel oil. The vessel, a 38,889
deadweight ton tank ship, carried over 8 million gallons for the Salem power
station. She was built in 1960 at the Eriksbergs Shipbuilders in Germany. February
1978 found her serviceable but neglected. She appeared to have been worked
hard with a bare minimum expended on upkeep. Nearly half her ulage covers
had been painted shut, doggings were frozen and deck plating in some areas was
rusted in layers.
Saturday, 4 February 1978: Transfer of the vessel's cargo was completed.
Some delay had been experienced initially after Coast Guard Personnel inspected
the vessel earlier and ordered transfer operations suspended pending repairs
to the ship's steam smothering system, a vital part of the ships fire fighting apparatus.
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Upon discharge of her cargo, the tanker took on 400 tons of bunker fuel for her
power plant, and was brought to anchor in Salem Sound at 8:30 PM in order to
heat and separate 88,000 gallons of contaiminated cargo remaining aboard. She
anchored in 40 feet of water using 4 shots of chain on the starboard anchor.
The anchorage was located 0.8 miles from the northeast tip of an obscure land
mass called Coney Island. At the time of the GLOBAL HOPE's anchoring, weather
eyes were turned to a building disturbance approaching New England. On Sunday
the National Weather Service forecasted a severe winter storm to strike New
England on the following day.
Monday, 6 February 1978: Morning hours revealed the solid leaden clouds
which herald winter storms in New England. Visibility was good at thirteen
miles, and wind speeds ranged from 8 to 17 knots. Late afternoon, however,
brought a significant change.
By 6:00 P.M. visibility was reduced to approximately 1000 feet in blowing
snow, and windspeeds had increased to 42 knots with gusts up to 61. While the
storm grew, the GLOBAL HOPE had remained at anchor in Salem Sound. During
late afternoon, however, when buffeted by high winds, the vessel began to drag
anchor and drift to the southwest. By 6:10 P.M., Coast Guard Station Gloucester
received a message from the vessel that she was flooding in the engine room
and at 8:42 PM she reported having grounded on the shoals off Coney Island.
Immediately upon notification of the grounding, procedures for responding
to an oil pollution threat were implemented by the Coast Guard. Much of the
response was automatic. The end of January had seen the Bouchard Barge 105
split in two during loading while moored in New Hampshire's swift running Piscataqua
River. On the same day as the GLOBAL HOPE's grounding, the coastal tanker
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HAROLD RHINEHAUER, with over 80 thousand gallons of oil aboard, had run
aground in Portland, Maine. The mechanisms for response were well oiled by
the time the GLOBAL HOPE grounded and reaction was quick.
Captain Walter Folger, USCG, as Chief of the Marine Safety Division,
First Coast Guard District, encompassing roughly the area of New England, was
contacted immediately. He was also chairman of the Coastal RR T serving New
England. The team was composed of representatives from selected federal and
state agencies and functioned to provide government coordination, advice, and
support during an actual pollution emergency.4 Captain Folger had served as
the team's chairman during the previous year's ARGO MERCHANT incident.
Another veteran of the ARGO MERCHANT was Captain Lynn Hein USCG,
Commanding Officer, U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, Boston, within
whose geographic jurisdiction lay the grounded GLOBAL HOPE. Captain Hein,
therefore, would act as the federally appointed OSC for a GLOBAL HOPE oil
spill.

5

It would be his job to orchestrate the actual on-scene response. As a

result of his experience as OSC during the ARGO MERCHANT incident and two
years' involvement with some 600 oil spills of different magnitudes, he would
bring a wealth of experience to the scene of the GLOBAL HOPE. He was advised
immediately of the stricken tanker's status. With the concurrence of the Chief
of the Marine Safety Division and within an hour of the grounding, members
of the RRT were telephonically activated by Marine Safety Division watchstanders,
Due to the severity of the storm it would be 8 days before the team would be
able to convene for a meeting.
Activation of the RR T took place in accordance with federal regulations
dictating such action in the event of a potential major oil spill. 6 At the time
of the GLOBAL HOPE's grounding, no oil was known to have escaped but she
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was acknowledged to be carrying a substantial amount of product and fuel, and
her percarious position within sight of one of the most environmentally sensitive
and picturesque coastal areas of Massachusetts' north shore, left little room for
.
. 7
hesrtatton,

During the night of 6-7 February, the OSC requested that the Coast Guard's
Atlantic Strike Team (AST), based at Elizabeth City, North Carolina, get underway
for the Boston area with vital emergency equipment. ADAPTS pumps capable
of transferring 1800 gallons of water and petroleum per minute, open water barriers
to boom the vessel, and necessary personnel were loaded aboard waiting Coast
Guard aircraft. The AST would provide communications support, advice, and
physical assistance in oil removal operations. One of three Coast Guard teams
located throughout the U.S., the AST possesses expertise in ship salvage, diving,
and oil removal methodology techniques.
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The team is equiped with a substantial

amount of emergency response equipment.
The OSC also received authority to use the Coast Guard Cutter SPAR,
a 180 foot buoy tender based in Portland, Maine. The SPAR would be used as
a delivery platform for the additional pumps and the high seas barrier then located
with the AST contingent in New Hampshire at the site of the Barge 105. During
this time frame commercial oil spill clean-up contractors in the Boston area
were alerted. The Coast Guard White Sage was ordered to stand by at Woods
Hole, meanwhile, in the event she were needed.
On 7 February the storm peaked with minimal visibility and high winds
being experienced. Some 30 inches of snow were recorded at Boston's Logan
Airport with accumulations of over 4 feet elsewhere and insurmountable drifts
up te 9 feet throughout the coastal region. Hurricane force winds were experienced

9

and tides ran 10 to 16 feet above normal along the Massachusetts coast. A state
of emergency was declared by the Governor. Highways were clogged throughout
the state with drifts piled high over stranded vehicles. Logan Airport was closed
to all traffic. The National Guard was activated. Aircraft from Coast Guard
Air Station Cape Cod, some 80-odd miles to the southeast, were unable to launch
for pollution surveillance overflights. The Coast Guard Cutter DECISIVE, a
210 foot medium endurance cutter rode the storm off Salem harbor after a violent
crossing of Massachusetts Bay through 30 foot seas. DECISIVE had responded
to orders from her District command to proceed to the GLOBAL HOPE's assistance
and remove the tanker's crewmembers to safety.
By dusk on the seventh, it had been snowing for nearly 30 hours. Snow
accumulation had paralyzed all transportation systems. Highways were impassable
and rail service had been inoperative since the previous eve. Pollution response
activity was restricted to radio and telephone communications.
Wednesday,8 February 1978: Just before first light the blizzard ended,
winds slackened, and by 7:00 AM visibility opened to 12 miles. A Coast Guard
helicoptor sighted the first indications of pollution: oil emanating from the vessel's
stern. The forces which had been galvanized by radio and telephone began to
arrive or get underway. AST equipment and personnel from Coast Guard Air
Station Elizabeth City arrived at Air Station Cape Cod at 9:55 AM aboard four
engine C-130 Hercules Cargo aircraft. They were transferred by helicopter
to the GLOBAL HOPE. The Cutter DECISIVE moved in and removed all crew
members with the exception of the master, chief engineer, chief mate, and radio
operator. Additional equipment and representatives of the owner were air-lifted
to nearby Gloucester Coast Guard Station where the OSC had established his

initial command post. By late afternoon the Cutter SPAR was moored alongside
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the grounded vessel with needed equipment. The 133 foot Cutter WHITE SAGE
was underway from Woods Hole with an open-sea containment boom which had
been delivered to Air Station Cape Cod. Impassable roads had prevented overland
delivery from the airfield.
Having determined that the GLOBAL HOPE posed a substantial threat
of pollution, the OSC sought authority under federal law to direct all public and
private efforts toward removal or elimination of the threat in the event theo
owners did not take adequate action. 9 Authorization was quickly received from
die Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard. Shortly thereafter a survey of the vessel's

engine room revealed flooding with 12 to 18 inches of oil floating on the surface
()I)~ater.

Oil was observed escaping from the vessel's stern, confirming

similar reports received from early morning overflights. The heavy seas and
grounding had caused damage to the vessel's rudder post and stern frame, and
oil had been allowed egress to the ocean.
Although representatives for the owner had engaged a local pollution control
contractor to contain and cleanup any oil spilled, the OSC determined that adequate
action was not being taken and under authority mandated by the FWPCA 10 and
its regulatlons

t

'

he assumed responsibility for removal of pollutants. AST

personnel set up skimming equipment in the engine room and commenced pumping
20-25,000 gallons into the port wing tank and 5-8,000 gallons into the starboard
wing tank. Meanwhile, a 500 foot length of 36 inch boom was placed around
the stern of the grounded vessel and back anchored to the beach at Coney Island
in an effort to contain any escaping oil. Additional boom needed for complete
encirclement of the ship could not be delivered due to clogged roads.
A boarding party's initial evaluation disclosed a crack in the stern area
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of the hull, damage to several aft tanks, and the broken rudder post. There
was free communication with the sea and between several tanks. A light sheen
on the water surface was observed between the port quarter and Coney Island.
Throughout the day Coast Guard equipment and personnel arrived on scene.
Two members of the Coast Guard's Public Information Assist Team had been
able to make their way from Portland, Maine where they had been working a
potentially major spill from the coastal tanker HAROLD RHINEHAUER. They
joined the OSC at his command post. They would prove invaluable in assisting
with public affairs efforts during the forthcoming two weeks. Meanwhile AST
resources continued to arrive at Air Station Cape Cod and were being shuttled
to staging points near Salem. The two cutters SPAR and WHITE SAGE were
off-loading pumps and boom at the vessel and the command post. Massachusetts
authorities had been contacted, and state police stood by to provide escorts for
equipment and personnel. By nightfall the command post at Gloucester was
in full operation.
Thursday, 9 February 1978: The first significant reports of serious pollution
began to filter in. AST personnel, in sounding the port wing tank on the morning
of the ninth, discovered the loss of some 15,000 gallons of water-oil mixture
which had been transferred from the engine room. The tank had been breached
and was in communication with the sea. Simultaneously heavy ground swells
in the aftermath of the storm grounded the containment boom around the stern
of the vessel at low water, rendering it ineffective in trapping the lost oil. Throughout
the day reports were received from local residents of oil coming ashore near
Marblehead, Massachusetts. Unknown to the OSC, approximately 60,000 gallons
_Qf oil escaped the vessel when she grounded. Inspection disclosed heavy concentrations
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heretofore hidden by snow. Surveys also revealed the intensity of the storm

where wind-driven oil had been deposited on roofs some 40 feet above the usual
high water marks.
Contractors were hired to boom the vessel and clean oil from affected
shorelines. The National Fish and Wildlife Service was alerted and requested
to survey the area. Injury to wildlife would prove to be negligible. Discovery
of damage to the vessel and her hard aground position elicited a request by the
OSC for assistance from the U.S. Navy's Supervisor of Salvage (SUPSALV). That
office specialized in salvage operations for naval activities and possesses the
expertise vital to the possible refloating of the vessel.
Aboard the vessel, oil skinning operations continued in the engine room
with oil product being stored in secure tanks. A local barge with a 420,000 gallon
capacity was contracted and by late afternoon was lightering oil from the grounded
ship. Overhead, pollution surveillance flights with OSC observers aboard kept
a constant check on the vessel and the nearby shorelines. Weather conditions
had improved considerably and the National Weather Service provided the OSC
with twice daily forecasts for the Salem area.
By the ninth, conditions had stabilized to the extent that clean up, containment,
and oil removal operations were well underway. Aboard the vessel, the Commanding
Officer of the AST supervised off-loading of oil. Ashore, clean up activities
were being monitored by personnel from Marine Safety Office, Boston.
Friday, 10 February 1978: A Coast Guard Hercules landed at Logan Airport
with a SUPSALV representative and additional equipment. The salvage expert
reported to the new mobile AST provided command post which had been flown
in and convoyed by state police to a location more accessible to the GLOBAL
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HOPE. That afternoon the OSC, the SUPSALV representative, local divers who
had been hired to check the vessel's hull, and the Commanding Officer of the
AST determined that the vessel could be refloated at high tide with the assistance
of tugs.
Saturday, 11 February 1978: By late afternoon, a "no cure - no pay" contract
had been made by the vessel's owners with a salvage firm to refloat the vessel
and have it towed to the Bethlehem Shipyard in East Boston. Coast Guard personnel
and equipment were placed on standby to assist the salvors upon request, and
control of the vessel was returned to the owners. At the same time, the owner's
representatives declined responsibility for clean-up which left the OSC with
a total and continuing responsibility for removal of oil from affected beaches
and the vessel itself.
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Oil which was being off-loaded from the GLOBAL HOPE

was being transferred to a local shore facility for storage while oily refuse from
beaches were stockpiled inland.
On 11 and 12 February salvage preparations were undertaken. Ballast was
transferred and using tugs the vessel turned 70 degrees to starboard in hopes
of refloating at high tide on the afternoon of 13 February.
Monday, 13 February 1978: At high tide salvors were unable to dislodge
the vessel. Further inspection revealed more serious bottom damage than had
been estimated. Port tanks numbers, 9, 10, and 11 had been breached with center
tanks 10 and 11 and starboard tank 11 possibly being flooded through damaged
bulkheads. Upon failure to refloat the vessel, the owners indicated no further
immediate interest in salvage, and the salvors withdrew from the venture. The
OSC reassumed control of the ship.
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Beach clean-up continued during hours of daylight. An Environmental
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Protection Agency (EPA) Scientific Support Coordinator, requested by the

esc,

reported to the command post and proceeded to evaluate the oil's impact on
affected shorelines. Clean-up procedures were recommended which would be
least disturbing to the environment.
Tuesday, 14 February 1978: Members of the RRT and advisors who had
been able to make their way into Boston convened in the Regional Response
Center located within the First Coast Guard District's, Marine Safety Division.
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By that time major highways throughout the area had been opened though the
ban on all but emergency use remained. National Guard Military Police patrolled
access points into Boston and major highways. Attendees at the team meeting
included representatives from the States of Maine, Massachusetts, the EPA,
the Atlantic Strike Team, National Weather Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service,
the Army Corps of Engineers, the National Marine Fishery Service and Coast
Guard legal and public relations representatives.Y The

esc briefed the team

on clean-up activities and the ill-fated attempt to refloat the vessel. Continuing
plans called for ballasting to prevent any movement or working of the ship caused
by the treacherous and unpredictable weather which characterizes the New
England coast in winter.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts voiced strong opinions that some
unnamed federal agency should remove the vessel itself to prevent its becoming
a monument. This concern continued to occupy state and local thinking throughout
the incident, though the chairman of the RRT explained that the only interest
of the RRT and the OSC was the elimination of all pollution threat from the
vessel. No federal RRT member agency had statutory authority to undertake
. the vesse I•16 C onsiiderati
,
salvage for the sole purpose of removing
eration was given
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to the possibility that removal of the pollution threat might best be accomplished
by removal of the vessel itself, however. To that end, it was agreed that a Navy
Harbor Clearance Unit (HCU),17 experienced in the mechanics of salvage operations,
would be requested to survey the vessel to evaluate the possibilities for refloating.
During the week of 14 February removal of oil from the GLOBAL HOPE
continued as an interim measure in reducing the threat of further leakage. Ashore,
the accumulation of oily debris removed from the beaches became an immiment
problem. Officials of the towns in which both primary and secondary dump sites
were located refused to grant permission for the continuing storage of oily waste,
and so a third site some 45 miles from the scene was selected.
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In addition,

on 18 February small globules of oil were discovered on the Wellfleet Beach
area of Cape Cod. Analysis at the University of Rhode Island's oil identification
facility confirmed that it was GLOBAL HOPE oil which had travelled across
Massachusetts Bay to be deposited on the Cape's inner beach.
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Two miles of

shore line were impacted with an estimated 1000 gallons of oil. Removal action
was inititated immediately.
Finally between 17-20 February, the Navy's HCU team completed its
inspection and made its report to the OSC. The report was subsequently provided
to the on-scene representative of the SUPSALV as well as to civilian salvors.
It was SUPSALV's opinion that the GLOBAL HOPE could be patched and refloated,
but due to the damage done and poor condition of the vessel there was no assurance
of a sustained afloat period.
Friday, 24 February 1978: The RRT again convened in Boston. The OSC
briefed the team on the HCU's report and NAVSUPSAL's evaluation as to refloating.
Authority had been received by this time from the Commandant of the Coast
Guard to remove, sink, or destroy the vessel in order to insure against further
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pollution. 20 Strong opposition arose, however, against any effort to remove
the vessel to sea for disposal. Clearly, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
was opposed to any such action which might, in its opinion, interfere with fishing
activities in the nearby Georges Banks. Of major concern to the Commonwealth
was the 20-25,000 gallons of oil projected to remain aboard upon sinking.
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The second RRT meeting closed with no specific resolution of the problem but
with the team to be reconvened seven days later, having researched more favorable
disposal sites as well as alternative proposals.
Saturday, 25 February 1978: During the five days that followed, the OSC
efforts were directed toward clean up and removal and technical evaluations
as to off-loading costs and procedures. On 25 February he requested and received
approval from the Chief of Naval Operations for the assistance of the SUPSALV
in refloating the vessel in preparation for disposal at sea if that were to be the
course of action.
Wednesday, 1 March 1978: At 8:30 AM the protection and indemnity club
which insured the owners against pollution liability accepted an offer by salvors
to refloat the GLOBAL HOPE and tow it to the Bethleham Steel shipyard in
East Boston. At the RR T meeting on the same morning, the team was advised
of these developments. The membership considered alternate plans should the
salvor's efforts fail. Expertise from the RRT member agencies was provided
in areas of fisheries, currents, and site location if disposal at sea become necessary.22
This secondary plan was contingent upon removal of as much oil prior to towing
as was feasible, maintenance of the vessels structural integrity, and towage
during favorable weather, all contributing to the least pollution and safest passage.
Wednesday,8 March 1978: Some 340 thousand gallons of oil had been
removed from the GLOBAL HOPE. Control of the vessel was transferred to
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private salvors after she had been patched and her seaworthiness for the short
trip to East Boston assured. As the last tug attached its towing hawser, the
GLOBAL HOPE floated free. Several hours later, she was moored at the Bethlehem
Shipyard where the remaining oil was removed and more effective repairs initiated.
She was sold for scrap and eventually towed to a Gulf Port.

III HIGHLIGHTS

Initial Response: One of the more noteworthy aspects of the GLOBAL
HOPE incident was the successful organization of the federal response. Transport
of equipment and personnel to both the command post and the grounded vessel
were paramount concerns. All highways were closed, as were rai1lines and the
airport, and some degree of ingenuity came into play in ensuring the arrival of
resources.
Recognizing the need for state support in ensuring timely delivery of equipment
and personnel, state officials were instrumental in providing access to Boston's
Logan Airport. In addition, Coast Guard vessels and aircraft were quickly inventoried
and pressed into service as the need arose and weather permitted. In the event
additional airlift capability would become necessary, giant Army Skycrane helicopters
from Fort Eustis, Virginia were placed on alert. As a result of the blizzard,
a ban on driving had been issued and civilian tugboat crews and contractors,
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who were vital to the response effort, faced possible arrest enroute to the scene.
Letters of authorization had to be issued by the OSC, therefore, to insure clearance
through police and National Guard check points. Uniformed Coast Guard personnel
experienced little interference.
Though physical response to the scene of the grounding was initially prevented
by weather, early liaison with state and federal agencies possessing vital equipment
and personnel avoided costly delays in bringing resources to bear when lines of
transportation were cleared. Upon being alerted to the grounding, communications
among the OSC, the chairman of the RRT, and Marine Safety Division personnel
were immediate. Conference calls were set up and responsibilities out-lined.
Initial efforts evolved around alerting as many resources as possible to allow
maximum preparation time to units such as the AST located some 1,100 miles
away.
In spite of emergency conditions generated by the storm and the accompanying
pressure on the telephone system, communications did not prove a problem.
In instances where phone lines were tied up, operators expedited calls when
assured that a federal emergency existed. Furthermore, all parties involved
in the initial response had been previously alerted to two other potentially major
spills which had occurred within two weeks, one in fact having taken place within
twenty-four hours. All parties, by the time of the incident, were well aware
of alert procedures and anticipated their individual responsibilities. Critical
information was passed with minimal confusion.
Public Affairs: Past Experience had proven that continuing promulgation
of information via news releases and briefings could do much to facilitate the
federal pollution response efforts. In the case of GLOBAL HOPE, initial efforts
to insure effective communications with government leaders entailed telephonically
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briefing concerned public officials. In addition First Coast Guard District public
affairs personnel were alerted shortly after the grounding, and the Coast Guard's
Public Information Assist Team contingent, which had responded to a spill in
Maine, was advised to proceed to the GLOBAL HOPE command post as soon
as possible. The Assist Team members were specially trained in oil spill public
affairs. By February 8 they were able to make their way to Salem where they
aided the OSC and district personnel in media relations and briefings. Throughout
the progress of the federal response, the OSC ensured the availability of timely
information to all levels of government and to concerned citizens.
From February 9 through March 8, operations conducted by the OSC in
the area of public affiars were continuous. During the first week, briefings of
the news media, political figures, and local interest groups occurred daily. Charts
and explanations of areas affected, tactics used, and the reasons underlying judgemental
decisions characterized all briefing sessions. As significant developments occurred
in cleanup and salvage efforts, press conferences and television coverage were
scheduled. During the last RRT meetings on February 24 and March 1, local officials
were invited as observers and were afforded opportunities to advise the team
of their concerns.
In essence, efforts in ensuring current and reliable media coverage and
public liaison fostered an understanding of the federal government's role in oil
spill response. Furthermore, as a result of scheduled briefings and an active
effort to include political and local civic interests, cleanup and salvage efforts
progressed unhampered and oftimes were expedited by a spirit of cooperation
and involvement.
Cleanup and Disposal: Roughly 85,000 gallons of oil were recovered from
beaches after the GLOBAL HOPE spill. Most oil was taken from a 3,200-yard

-----------------------~---
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stretch of the Marblehead promontory and from Coney Island where the vessel
had grounded. An additional 1,000 gallons were taken from Cape Cod, 50 miles
across the bay, where a drifting pancake of oil had broken up into tar balls and
come ashore. Aside from the Cape Cod cleanup, response operations fell into
three major work programs which were conducted simultaneously: off-loading
of the vessel; shoreline cleanup from Fluen Point to Locust Cove in Marblehead;
and shoreline cleanup from Locust Cove to Peach Point.
At the time of the vessel's grounding she had some 88,000 gallons of contaminated No.6 oil in the No.6 center tank. She also maintained approximately
35,000 gallons of cargo and more than 200,000 gallons of bunker fuel. Upon
grounding, approximately 60,000 gallons of mixed oil escaped from the ship's
bunker tanks and the double bottoms in way of the engine room, where she was
holed. Subsequently, approximately 15,000 gallons escaped the port wing tank
which had been breached. The oil from the wing tank fouled the beacnes and
shoals of Coney Island itself, and to a minor degree, Castle Island.
Initial responses to the spill included a request by the OSC for continuing
Coast Guard overflights of the site. At first, overflights were restricted due
to weather conetitions, but aircrews were available during any break in weather
and were effective in giving timely notification to the OSC of suspected contamination sites. The first over-flight, conducted in conjunction with a search
and rescue effort, detected oil escaping from the rudder post area of the vessel.
Upon discovery of polluted shorelines, cleanup activity was commenced immediately.
Two contractors were ultimately assigned responsibility for separate sections
of beach, thereby bringing maximum manpower to bear.
Early in the incident, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was alerted
to the need for designated disposal sites. Location of such facilities continues
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to be a responsibility of the state and in the case of Massachusetts required
canvassing of local resources. In view of the weather, proximity was important
and two locations within 20 miles were initially identified as primary and secondary
sites. Due to local resistance to disposal at nearby facilities, however, a third
site was selected some 45 miles away at a substantial increase in cost.
At the request of the OSC, two federal officials provided vital environmental
expertise. After oil was discovered leaking from the vessel, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service was contacted and a representative arrived on scene to evaluate
oil contamination of water fowl. The impact was minimal. In addition, a scientific
support coordinator from the EPA was requested by the OSC. His analysis of
the environmentally-sensitive beach area and recommendations for beach cleanup
techniques proved invaluable in deploying contractors and directing removal
activity. His report was used well into the summer months as a guide for onscene monitors.
Shoreline cleanup included an innovative hot water blasting technique which
previously had not been attempted in the region. Contrived by the EPA Scientific
Support Coordinator, the civilian cleanup contractor, and Coast Guard personnel,
it involved pressurized hot water being sprayed against boulders and outcroppings,
Oil was flushed from the rocks into boomed areas where it was vacuumed from
within the contained space. Although steam was available it was considered
more damaging to the environment and did not provide the flushing characteristic.
Hot water was employed at mid and high tide levels in order to insure maximum
flushing action with minimum damage to the fragile shoreline ecology.
Farther inland, tides running 16 feet above the normal high had combined
with heavy wave action to deposit 18 inches of oil in some yards. Roofs and
the seaward sides of two-story homes were splattered with oil
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In cleaning impacted areas, contractors necessarily risked damaging property.
Trees had to be cut down in several places to gain access to beaches and heavy
equipment had to be moved across property. A major problem involved claims
for reimbursement from the federal pollution fund. Claims were made by local
citizens who alleged damage done to their property by contractors during the
response effort. Under the FWPCA such losses are reimbursable, from the federal
pollution fund. Storm damage was not reimbursable, however, since it would
have occurred regardless of an oil spill. Causes of specific damages were often
resolved by using photographs depicting the condition of the property prior to
a contractor's entry.
In an effort to deal with the threat of further pollution from the vessel,
the OSC requested and received authority under the FWPCA to treat the vessel
as a marine disaster which was creating a substantial threat of continuing pollution.
The vessel's precarious position and the presence of more than 300 thousand
gallons of oil aboard, encouraged a "substantial threat" determination. Under
such a finding, the OSC was empowered to coordinate and direct all public and
private efforts aimed at the removal or elimination of the threat. Ultimately,
he also was granted the more extreme authority to remove, and if necessary,
destroy the vessel itself, by whatever means necessary.
With a "substantial threat" determination in hand, however, AST personnel,
pumps, booms, Coast Guard cutters, and civilian vessels were amassed in an
effort to remove oil remaining aboard the GLOBAL HOPE. Coast Guard cutters
were diverted to the scene with vital equipment, effecting an "end run" around
snow-clogged highways. State police escorted equipment and personnel where
highways were open. Aboard the vessel, estimations of oil on board were made,
the integrity of the vessel checked, and transfer of oil to secure tanks commenced
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in preparation for off-loading to barges.
At the time of her grounding, GLOBAL HOPE contained more than 340,000
gallons of oil in some form. At the time of her refloating all but 68,000 gallons
had been removed to shore-side facilities. Most of the remainder was stripped
at the shipyard. The risk of massive contamination of the coastline was minimize
by the expeditious transfer of oil from the vessel, although cleanup of the 60,000 .
gallons which washed ashore in Marblehead continued until August 2.
Pollution Fund: Under federal regulations, the OSC is tasked with several
responsibilities during an oil spill. He must evaluate the magnitude and severity
of the incident,24 he must determine the feasibility of removal,25 and, finally,
he must assess the effectiveness of removal actions.
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When oil removal action

is being conducted improperly by private interests, the OSC is required to take
necessary steps to remove the pollutant?? He accomplishes this with monies
available to him from the $35,000,000 revolving fund created under the FWPCA.
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Ultimately, more than 2.4 million dollars was spent from the fund in cleanup,
removal, and off-loading costs.
Although some 60,000 gallons of oil had leaked undetected from tanks which
were damaged upon grounding, the first indications of a spill from the vessel
came in the early morning hours of February 8 when a slick was discovered around
her stern. The rudder had been bent and the hull ripped. The likely explanation
was that hydraulic oil was leaking from the steering engine. At the time, the
owner's representative had engaged a local contractor to contain and remove
any discharge, but his actions were judged inadequauate, and the OSC assumed
control of cleanup activity.
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According to the FWPCA, liability for costs of removing oil which has
been or threatens to be discharged from a vessel may fall to its owner or operator
if the vessel is over 300 gross tons and uses U.S. ports or navigable water. 29
At the time of her grounding, the GLOBAL HOPE'S owner or operator was liable
for removal costs in an amount not to exceed the lesser of $100 per gross ton
or $14,000,000 dollars. Thus the vessel's liability based on her gross tonnage
approached $2,300,000.
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However, where a discharge is caused solely by an

act of God, the owner or operator is relieved from financialliability.31 It was
likely within this provision that the vessel's owner questioned the propriety of
assuming responsibility, claiming the blizzard as the proximate cause of the
grounding and oil discharge. He declined responsibility for shoreline removal
of oil and thereby, liability under the law. Whatever the resolution of the owner's

-

claim, the fund provided resources with which to hire and reimburse contractors.
Contracting assistance was afforded on scene by the First Coast Guard District's
Comptroller Division, with the beach cleanup effort arranged for under terms
of existing pre-negotiated agreements with contractors. Removal and cleaning
of oil from the vessel itself required a new and separate accord, however.
Overall, essential fiscal support was effective. Minor difficulties were
resolved quickly, all parties recognizing the need for expeditious handling and
resolution of requests. The presence at the scene of personnel schooled in fiscal
procedures proved vital to the continuity of cleanup activity. Not only were
unforeseen demands satisfied in a seasonable manner, but payments to contractors
from the pollution fund were made with minimal delay. In this latter case, contractors
had committed themselves to massive investments of time, equipment, and personnel
in responding to the incident, and reserve funds would have been exhausted in
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short order without timely reimbursements.
Vessel Salvage and Disposal Operations: Salvage of the GLOBAL HOPE
was an integral consideration in pollution response planning, for if the vessel
could be moved to a local shipyard, the threat of additional contamination as
well as mounting costs could be minimized. The Coast Guard and other federal
agencies, of course, are not in the salvage business and would not actively become
involved in such an undertaking unless, as an option, salvage would facilitate
removal of the pollution threat. The possibility of the owner's or liability insurer's
embarking on such a project, however, had great appeal from the standpoint
of contingency planning. If the seaworthiness of the vessel could be guaranteed
for a short trip to a local shipyard and if further pollution could be avoided,
dockside facilities could come into play in removing oil at a substantially reduced
cost. In addition, shipyard facilities could be employed to ensure seaworthiness
of the vessel for future disposition.
Recognizing the possibility of a salvage operation, early on February 9,
the OSC requested a SUPSALV representative on scene. One was made available
by the Navy immediately, and throughout the GLOBAL HOPE incident he proved
to be an invaluable source of expertise and advice to the OSC. Working at times
16 hours a day, the SUPSALV representative remained on scene throughout the
response effort. He reviewed all plans involving the salvage of the vessel and
took an active role in orchestrating salvage operations.
On February 9, a civilian salvage representative was granted permission
to land at Logan Airport and was escorted to the GLOBAL HOPE command post.
He had received notification of the grounding from Lloyd's Intelligence Service
and had conferred with the owner's representative. The representative and the
salvor contracted for the refloating and removal of the vessel on a "no cure-no Day"
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basis, proceeding on limited information as to the integrity of the vessel obtained
by divers hired by the OSC. A refloat attempt was made, but failed due to unanticipated
bottom damage and flooding of the cargo tanks. Thereafter, the salvor indicated
no further interest in salvaging the vessel without further extensive survey and
withdrew from the venture.
Control of the vessel was reassumed by the OSC and emphasis returned
to elimination of any further pollution threat. The ship was ballasted down to
sit heavily on the bottom in order to preclude further damage from storms.
Heretofore, the OSC had been operating under authority granted by the Commandant
to take such actions as were necessary for the removal or elimination of the
pollution threat. 32 After the Navy HCU had examined her, however, it was
determined, with SUPSALV concurrence, that with patching and dewatering
the vessel could be refloated. Additional authority was granted thereafter, to
remove, and if necessary, destroy the vessel.
A proposal to remove and sink the ship at a predesignated spot met with
resistance. The danger of pollution from some 20,000 gallons of residue oil which
would be left aboard concerned state officials and the National Marine Fisheries
Service members of the Regional Response Team. In respnse, the team undertook
a study to ensure a suitable location at sea where the GLOBAL HOPE could be
sunk. It also developed alternatives to sinking and set priorities on its recommendations,
suggesting the vessel be: (1) salvaged and scrapped by the owner or insurer; (2)
salvaged and towed to Boston; (3) salvaged and sunk at sea at a designated site;
or finally, (4) cleaned and left in place. In the event of a third option, a site
was recommended which was remote from established fishing grounds and in
a position where the Coast Guard's Oceanographic Unit postulated that any
34
With the disposal site in hand,
escaping residue oil would be carried out to sea.
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the OSC commenced preparation for removal of the vessel.
Before federal efforts could commence, however, civilian salvors convinced
the insurer that savings would be realized if the vessel could be refloated by
commercial operators rather than by the U.S. Government. The salvors had
been supplied with the HCU's evaluations on the vessel's refloatability as well
as government estimates of the costs of cleaning the vessel in place. Some 1.6
million dollars was the appraisal figure for cleaning in place, and it was clear
that the OSC intended to ensure the off-loading of all possible sources of pollution.
In a joint venture and with a plan approved by the OSC, the salvors implemented
their salvage operations. During their efforts in readying the vessel, lightering
of oil continued and the SUPSALV representative monitored all actions for the
OSC. On March 8 the vessel was refloated and towed to a shipyard in East Boston,
whereupon she became the property of the salvors. She was held for salvage
bids and sold for scrap to a Texas firm. 35
The salvage of the GLOBAL HOPE solved two major problems. It transferred
the vessel to a location where on-board oil was removed expeditiously and less
expensively. It also allayed the state's fear of having a 680-foot rusting steel
monument to the "Great Blizzard of 78" perched atop Coney Island in Salem
Sound.
State and Federal Involvement: Since it occurred within a coastal area,
federal on-scencoordination responsibilities in the GLOBAL HOPE incident fell
to the Coast Guard and aside from civilian contractor personnel, the Coast Guard
provided the mass of personnel in responding to the spill. The interface between
the OSC and other agencies of federal and state governments, however, prevailed
throughout the orchestration of cleanup, disposal, and off-loading operations.
From other federal agencies, the OSC received scientific support, weather
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forecasting, salvage assistance and expertise, ocean current projections, and
logistical support. State agencies responded to tasks of a local nature such as
identification of disposal sites, clearance over lines of transportation, and identification
of waterfowl cleaning and collection facilities. Their efforts were timely and
enthusiastic. The spirit of cooperation which prevailed resulted perhaps, from
the wide and frequent dissemination of information to federal, state and local
interests regarding the incident and to personal contact with government of
ficials where their assistance was needed.
Admittedly, since the ARGO MERCHANT incident of 1976, both federal
and state authorities have become more aware of their responsibilities under
the law. During that occurrence, the danger of 6 million gallons of oil fouling
Massachusetts' beaches, shellfish beds, and estuaries was clear and present.
Federal, state, local and even international interests were stirred. Although
GLOBAL HOWE presented no such massive threat as the ARGO MERCHANT,
the OSC was dealing with a more informed response network. Commitment
to assisting in the response effort was immediate at all levels of government,
and it is a satisfying note that all levels sought opportunities to contribute.

IV POST MORTEM ANALYSIS

On August 2, 1978, the GLOBAL HOPE case was closed, cleanup of the
Marblehead beach area having been completed. Earlier, the vessel had been
towed uneventfully, except for some precarious moments off Key West, to a
Gulf port in Texas and the bone yards.
In reviewing the response effort, several salient features deserve a final
commentary. The misconception, for example, that the Coast Guard is solely
responsible for the cleanup of coastal oil spills has, hopefully, been laid to rest
in the First Federal Region. In the past and for whatever reason, the public,
the press, state, local, and even some federal authorities tended to subscribe
to a belief that the messy business of cleanup was a Coast Guard show. The
realities, of course, are that the response is a federal obligation. Although the
Coast Guard may act as the lead agency or galvanizing force where the incident
falls within its jurisdiction, a consolidated federal response is mandated.
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Further-
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more, state and local governments are not mere bystanders with spectator priv-

ileges, Rather, they are vital members of the response network and are expected
to inject local considerations and concerns as well as providing state resources
where practical. It is to the Commonwealth's credit that throughout the GLOBAL
HOPE incident, Massachusetts, in general, made immediate and signal contributions
to the response effort. Though there were some occasions in which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was unprepared to deal with contingencies or accept
the consequences attending its dependence on imported oil, the state deserves
high marks for its support to field and staff units.
A second feature of the incident in Salem Sound which is noteworthy, was
the effective use of public affairs personnel and the informative briefing program
which was conducted during the incident. Trained public affairs personnel from
Coast Guard Headquarters and the First District's public affairs office were
quickly involved. They did much of the legwork in supporting the OSC's public
information program. Timely news briefings for the media were scheduled as
well as special advisories for governmental officials. As a result, a "well-inhand" atmosphere prevailed throughout the course of the federal response and
a spirit of cooperation and involvement was cultivated.
Finally, some credit for success must be given to the peculiar circumstances
which surrounded the incident. The RRT had been alerted on two other potentially
major spills within the preceding two weeks. Little time was wasted in bringing
3
team members up to speed as to conditions and/or responsibilities. ? The experience
supports arguments for a program of exercises in which mock spills occur and
team members and federal/state resources are activated or placed in an alert
status. Certainly such exercises would assist in exposing gaps in communications
links and weaknesses in state and federal support roles.
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In retrospect, when faced with the blizzard and three coexisting potential
major spiUs, the response to the GLOBAL HOPE spill was Iaudltory, "Monday
morning quarterbacking" has and wiH continue to expose weaknesses in the system,
and rightfuHy so. Though each spill will present its own peculiar properties for
which old tactics must be altered and new ones developed, there are common
problems which characterize similar spills and in-depth post mortems, hopefully,
will identify those areas where policy, guidance, or corrective action are called
for.
The incident at Salem Sound exemplifies the quick-response capability
whichftm i:tIfliEUoped within the New England coastal region. In the face of an
overwhelming storm and multi-governmental interests, a concerted effort was
brought to bear and a spirit of team work nurtured. The successful removal
of oil from the shoreline and the disposition of the offending vessel and its remaining
oil attest to the dedication and resourcefulness of the federal team and state
participants.

FOOTNOTES
1.

-,3 U.S.C. 1321 (1972)

2.

tIoOC.F.R.1510(1978)

3.

Certainly the ARGO MERCHANT pales compared to the 145,000,000
gallons of petroleum products equal to 20 ARGO MERCHANTS which was
disgorged during the first six months of 1942 within 50 miles of the U.S.
Atlantic coast. German submarines effected the equivelent of one ARGO
per month during this period. Ocean and coastal environments absorbed
the full impact and apparently, to the present, survived the devastation.
Impact of Oil S illa e From World War II Tanker Sinkin s, MIT Sea Grant
rogram,. eport o.
-, anuary

4.

40C.F.R.1510.34(1978)

5.

~uC.F.R.1510.5(c)(1978)

6.

~u

C.F.R. 1510.34(d) (1978)

7.

~u

C.F.R. 1510.5(m) (1978)

8.

tIoU C.F.R. 1510.54(a)(l) (1978)

9.

.,3 C.F.R. 132l(d) (1972)

10.

33C.F.R.132l(c)(1)(1972)

11.

40 C.F.R. 1510.41(c) (1978)

12.

40 C.F.R. 1510.53(a)(3) and 1510.36(a)(3) (1978)

13.

Shortly thereafter the hull underwriters declared the vessel a total loss.
Though having only a salvage interest, the owners still faced the problem
of liability for clean-up due to oil spillage under their protection and indemnity
insurance, assuming that they were not exempt under 33 U.S.C. 132 (p)(l).
If they could prove that the spillage resulted from an "Act of God" under
that section they would be held free of any liability.

14.

The Marine Safety Division is the unit on the First Coast Guard District
Commander's staff which is program manager for field units, which respond
to oil spill incidents.
33
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15.

The RRT is composed of Primary Agencies including the Departments of
Commerce, Defense, Interior, Transportation and the EPA. Advisory
Agencies are those which can make major contributions during a response
effort and may include HEW, Justice, State, etc. Individual states within
a region are also invited to attend and hold full voting privileges.

16.

The Coast Guard is not in the salvage business. Its mission is the protection
of life and property at sea, property including the environment. It has
no resources nor a mandate to salvage vessels declared a total loss. It
does have a mandate to advise mariners if the vessel poses a hazard to
navigation. The Army Corp of Engineers does have a responsibility to remove
obstructions to navigation. The GLOBAL HOPE posed no such obstruction
however.

17.

A Harbor Clearance Unit is a Navy organization skilled in the evaluation
and removal of underwater obstructions. Their skills include diving, explosive
ordinance and tactics, and vessel structure.

18.

The nearby towns felt environmentally threatened by the quantity of oil
and debris which was being accumulated. The locality which finally accepted
the refuse doubled its usual price for disposal.

19.

Identification of oil as originating from a particular source is called "oil
finger printing." The effectiveness of the technique rests on the principle
that oil is chemically affected by its containment facilities and each facility
leaves its indelible mark thus creating a "finger print." Using infra red
spectroscopy, fluorescence spectroscopy, gas chromatography and thin
layer chromatography, weathering effects such as sunlight, water, etc,
can be factored out and assuming a sufficient specimen, samples can be
compared and tied together.

20.

33. U.S.C. 132l{d) (l972)

21.

At the RR T meeting there was little doubt that at the depth to which the
GLOBAL HOPE would be sunk, any residue oil would not escape, having
become heavy and immobile due to the cold temperatures. Furthermore,
at the proposed location the depth was so great as to preclude any obstruction
to bottom fishing, the site being on the southern out skirt of the Georges
Bank. Interestingly enough Captain Arthur McKenzie of the Tanker Advisory
Center pointed out that probably as much as 100,000 gallons of oil was
being discharged at sea on anyone day off the Coast of New England by
foreign tankers washing tanks. In his opinion 20,000 gallons residue aboard
a sunken GLOBAL HOPE wasn't worth worrying about. Apparently the
Commonwealth and the National Marine Fisheries Agency were more concerned
with the publicity.

23.

33 U.S.C. 1321 (l972)

24.

40 C.F.R. 1510.42{a) (l978)

25.

40 C.F.R. 1510.44 (l978)

26.

40 C.F.R. 1510.42{a) (l978)

27.

40 C.F.R. 1510.42{c) (l978)

28.

33 U.S.C. 132l{k) (l972)
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29.

33 U.S.C. l32l(d) de (f) (1972)

30.

Recent amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act have i
increased the levels of liability. The new limits were not applicable however
at the time of the GLOBAL HOPE'S gounding.
"

31.

33 U.S.C. 1321 (1972)

32.

33 U.S.C. 132l(d)

33.

Ibid.

34.

The Coast Guard's Oceanographic Unit, located in Washington D.C. is
capable of providing timely projections of oil spill drift trajectories based
on current, tide and weather information.

35.

THE GLOBAL HOPE had an unremarkable history at the time of her arrival
in Salem Sound. Though less than 20 years had passed since her launching,
she had been sorely used by her owners. Vestiges of earlier rank and prestige
were revealed in the teak decking and mahogany railings of her mid-ship
house. Heavy layers of chipped paint, rusted doggings on hatch covers,
and clutter throughout testified to her neglect. As GLOBAL HOPE - she
had sailed at one time under another name. She had sustained a fire aboard
in 1974 and grounded in 1976. Her record since 1977 contained one deficiency
letter and several discrepancies, discovered when boarded by Coast Guard
inspectors at Salem. None of the latter items had any causal effect in
the vessel's grounding and the resultant oil spill in Salem Sound.

36.

The writer does not treat the comparable role of the EPA in responding
to inland (vice coastal) oil spills, and does not suggest that the EPA experiences
similar problems. OSC contact with that agency's representatives has
generally stemmed from their role as members on the RRT and as scientific
support coordinators on scene. They have been a faithful and reliable source
of assistance whenever called upon.

37.

As one wit responded after the second telephone alert, "Stand-bythey come
in three's." The humor would be short-lived, for within 12 hours the third
spill, the GLOBAL HOPE - did occur. Furthermore, within 48 hours thereafter,
a fourth alert would be sent out when over a million gallons of gasoline
would spill from a tank at a coastal area fuel storage facility.
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